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Abstract 
 
This paper analyzes the effect of educational mismatch on wages, using a rich panel dataset of 
workers in the major euro area countries from 2006 to 2009, drawn from the European Union 
Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (Eurostat). We use a consistent estimator to address 
the two econometric problems faced by the empirical literature: the omitted variable bias and 
measurement error. In principle, our fixed effect estimates confirm that overeducated workers 
suffer a wage penalty of similar magnitude to the return on each year of schooling attained. 
Interestingly, when we split the sample by age, we find that the wages of people aged under 35 
basically depend on the level of education attained, while those of workers aged over 35 depend 
on job educational requirements. These results are interpreted taking into account the impact 
of the depreciation of skills on human capital. The main policy implication of the paper is that 
overeducation constitutes a waste of resources. Therefore public authorities should seek to 
reduce the negative impact of overeducation on the labor market. 
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1.- Introduction 
The analysis of educational mismatch is a matter of public policy interest insofar as it may 
indicate an inefficient allocation of the resources invested in education. It should be noted that 
public expenditure on education accounted for 5.1% of the European Union's (EU) total GDP1 
in 2008, at the same time as public spending on tertiary education amounted to 1.1% of EU 
GDP. The EU countries, therefore, have invested heavily in education, as can be seen, amongst 
other indicators, in the significant rise in the number of students in tertiary education, which 
almost tripled between 1975 and 20092. However, in 2010 one out of every five graduates of 
tertiary education in Europe worked in a low-skilled job3. 
 
The aim of this paper is to analyze the effect of educational mismatch on wages. In the literature, 
two alternative theoretical hypotheses have been put forward to explain this problem: a) the 
human capital theory (Becker, 1964), which states, in a nutshell, that wages depend on the 
human capital of the worker and b) the job-competition theory (Thurow, 1975) which proposes 
that wages are dependent on the educational requirements of jobs. This theoretical debate has 
given rise to an extensive literature which attempts to test both hypotheses empirically. 
However, many of the papers that estimate the effect of educational mismatch on wages have 
been heavily criticized for not taking two important econometric problems into account: the 
omitted variable bias and measurement error of educational mismatch. For some authors the 
“omitted variable bias is substantial and possibly explains the entire difference between returns 
on required schooling and overschooling and underschooling” (Leuven and Oosterbeek, 2011). 
                                                          
1 Private funding represents 13.8% of total expenditure on education in the EU. See Eurydice (2012), pp. 
88 and 93. 
2 The number of students in tertiary education (ISCED 5 and 6) in the EU increased by 122% between 
1975/76 and 1999/2000 (Eurydice, 2002). During the following decade (2000-2009) the student 
population across the EU-27 increased by an average of 22% (Eurydice, 2012). The annual growth rate for 
each period is 3.4% and 2.7% respectively.  
3 Ibidem, Figure G7, pp. 181-182. 
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However, few empirical studies have considered these two problems and the results of those 
that have are mixed4.  
 
The main contribution of our work can be summed up as follows: 1) the use of a consistent 
estimator to address the problems of omitted variable bias and measurement error found in the 
literature, 2) the use of a new database, the European Union Statistics on Income and Living 
Conditions5 (EU-SILC, Eurostat) covering a wide range of countries belonging to the Eurozone, 
and 3) the development of an interpretation that reconciles the claims of the job-competition 
theory and the human capital theory regarding the effect of educational mismatch on wages. 
 
The main conclusions of our paper are as follows. First, after controlling for omitted variable bias 
and measurement error, the return on an additional year of schooling above the job educational 
requirements is very small. Workers experience some wage penalty for each year of schooling 
deficit, which is relatively larger for men than women. Second, the wages of workers aged under 
35 basically depend on the level of schooling attained (human capital theory), while those of 
people aged over 35 are determined by job educational requirements (job-competition theory). 
 
Our interpretation of this second finding is that as we move away from the moment of transition 
from school to the labor market, the level of education attained is not a good proxy for workers' 
current skills and productivity. If the human capital of overeducated workers has depreciated 
because of technical obsolesce of skills or by atrophy (De Grip and Van Loo, 2002), and the 
human capital of the undereducated has appreciated through learning by doing, the wages of 
                                                          
4 See the Literature Review in Section 2. 
5 The statistical information used in this article is a sample of full-time workers from 2006 to 2009 of 
countries belonging to the Eurozone in 2006 [excluding Germany, which is not included in the EU-SILC 
longitudinal database], that is, Austria, Belgium, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Portugal and The Netherlands. 
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the over 35s really depends on their present productivity and skills, and not on those they may 
have had when they left the education system. 
 
The main theoretical implication of our paper is that, if we take the depreciation (and 
appreciation) of human capital into account, we can reconcile the claims of the job-competition 
and human capital theories respectively. At a practical level, the economic policy implication of 
our paper is that overeducation implies a waste of the public and private resources invested in 
education, and for that reason, both researchers and public authorities should focus on 
investigating the problem, in a bid to better understand its causes and to design and implement 
measures that might reduce its impact on society. 
 
This article is structured as follows. First, we provide a brief review of the literature on 
overeducation, focusing in particular on those studies that analyze the problem from a 
longitudinal perspective. Second, we describe our data, drawn from the EU-SILC (Eurostat), and 
explain the method used to measure educational mismatch. The next section introduces the 
econometric framework used in our research. Here we specify the income functions and 
estimation methods used in a bid to deal with the problems of omission of ability and 
measurement error in educational mismatch. We then go on to present the empirical results, 
before outlining our main conclusions in the final section of the paper. 
 
2.- Literature Review 
The publication of The Overeducated American (Freeman, 1976) spawned a considerable body 
of literature on “the economics of overeducation”. Here we briefly examine this literature in 
order to put own research into context, whilst those interested in further reviews are 
recommended to see Green et al. (1999), Hartog (2000), McGuinness (2006), Quintini (2011) 
and Leuven and Oosterbeek (2011). 
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The literature on overeducation is grounded in a theoretical debate on how the labor market 
operates. The human capital theory (Becker, 1964) maintains that wages depend on workers’ 
investment in education. If the supply of a type of workers increases more than the demand, 
the outcome is a decrease in earnings. The mismatch between supply and demand does not lead 
to the underutilization of skills, but rather a temporary reduction in relative wages (Green et al., 
1999). An alternative approach is offered by the job-competition theory (Thurow, 1975). 
According to this, marginal product and wages are properties of the job, not in the individual. 
Accordingly, since most people acquire their skills through informal on-the-job training, the 
labor market is a market for allocating training slots. Individuals do not compete on wages but 
for job opportunities, based on the relative costs of training them.  In order to minimize training 
costs, employers rank potential workers on the basis of certain background characteristics, such 
as education or age. Workers are distributed across job (training) opportunities in accordance 
with their relative position in the labor queue. The most preferable workers get the best jobs. 
Therefore, if the supply of college workers outstrips the high-earning job opportunities, some of 
them will be forced to accept jobs for high-school graduates and receive the wages paid that 
correspond to these occupations.  
 
A large body of empirical research has been carried out in a bid to shed light on this debate 
about the influence of the individual (“who you are”) and the job (“what you do”) on the 
determination of wages. The starting point for these studies is the seminal work of Duncan and 
Hoffman (1981) who estimated the returns on the years of education required for jobs, and on 
the years of over- or under-education (the “ORU” earnings equation)6. In other studies, notably 
Verdugo and Verdugo (1989), the specification of the model combines years of schooling 
attained with two dummy variables representing overeducation and undereducation. However, 
                                                          
6“ORU” stands for Overeducation, Required education, and Undereducation. 
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as Hartog (2000) argues, it is preferable to transform the dummy variables into years of under- 
and over-schooling. 
 
Most empirical studies use cross-sectional data to conclude that the returns on years of 
overeducation are positive but significantly lower than the returns on years of appropriate 
education. Moreover, the returns on years of undereducation are negative and smaller in 
magnitude than the returns on matched education (Leuven and Oosterbeek, 2011). In this sense, 
educational mismatch supposes a cost to both individuals and the economy as a whole, in that 
it implies the inefficient allocation of resources. 
 
The two most important econometric issues in the estimation of the effects of educational 
mismatch on wages are the omission of ability and measurement error (Leuven and Oosterbeek, 
2011). The omission of relevant variables can lead to biases and inconsistencies in the estimates. 
If there is a correlation between ability (unobservable) and educational mismatch, the 
coefficients of the parameters obtained by ordinary least squares will be biased (Chevalier, 
2003). Moreover, measurement error may generate attenuation bias in the estimation of 
returns on education, a problem that tends to be exacerbated when the variables are measured 
in differences. 
 
There are relatively few longitudinal studies analyzing the impact of educational mismatch on 
wages, and their results are mixed. Bauer (2002) estimates the earnings equations proposed by 
Verdugo and Verdugo (1989) and Duncan and Hoffman (1981) using a panel of German data 
covering the period 1984-1998. Bauer estimates the pooled OLS model obtaining the usual 
results in the literature on overeducation. However, when he estimated the fixed-effects model, 
wage differentials between adequately and inadequately educated workers shrank or 
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disappeared completely. The same conclusions were reached by Marc Frenette (2004) and Tsai 
(2011).  
 
However, not all studies using panel data techniques question the results obtained from cross 
section data. Dolton and Silles (2008), for instance, study the determinants and effects of 
overeducation in a sample of college graduates in the UK. The empirical evidence they provide 
suggests that the upward bias that causes the omission of ability is offset by a downward bias of 
similar magnitude caused by measurement error. Verhaest and Omey (2012) obtain similar 
results when analyzing a longitudinal database of young Flemish workers. Finally, Korpi and 
Tahlin (2009) study the Swedish case using a longitudinal database covering the period 1974-
2000, concluding that the effect of educational mismatch on wages does not change 
substantially when differences in ability are controlled for, and that the wage penalty does not 
disappear over time. 
 
3.- The data and mismatch measurement 
Eurostat's EU-SILC7 is an annual survey which provides harmonized information on the income, 
employment situation and living conditions of the EU population. In this paper we analyze the 
longitudinal database from 2006 and 2009. In order to use homogeneous data, we selected a 
sample of full-time employees from the Eurozone countries covered by the longitudinal file, 
namely Austria, Belgium, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal 
and The Netherlands. The information includes 143,652 observations for 66,538 individuals. For 
the estimates of wage equations we have used the following variables (see Table 1): education, 
gender, work experience, experience squared, marital status and disability. 
 
                                                          
7 Disclaimer: Eurostat has no responsibility for the results and conclusions presented in this paper, which 
are those of the authors alone. 
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[Table 1, around here] 
 
Overeducation (undereducation) is represents the excess (lack) of education of a worker in 
relation to the qualification required to perform his/her job. Following the method proposed by 
Verdugo and Verdugo (1989), we define the level of education required for a job as the range of 
a standard deviation of the mean distance of the years of schooling of workers in the same 
occupation, country and year, using the International Classification of Occupations ISCO-88 to 
two digits. If an individual's level of education is above this range, s/he is overeducated; if below 
it, s/he is undereducated.  
 
Additionally, we have used the procedure proposed by Kiker et al. (1997) to elaborate a second 
indicator of educational mismatch from the mode of years of schooling in each occupation, 
country and year. Unlike in the previous case, educational requirements are not defined 
according to the range of standard deviation, but are rather based on the point estimate of the 
statistic. However, given that the overall pattern of results is very similar for both indicators, to 
avoid duplication of the number of tables, we show only the estimates obtained with the mean 
index. The mean indicator tends to provide estimates of educational mismatch of smaller 
magnitude than those obtained from the mode. All-in-all, when comparing the classification 
results obtained from the mean and the mode we find that 79.79% of the observations of the 
panel fit into the same category (see Table 2). 
 
[Table 2, around here] 
 
Figure 1 shows the incidence of educational mismatch by age and educational level. The first 
conclusion to be drawn is that, when using the mean indicator, educational mismatch is 
polarized in the two extreme educational levels, ie in lower secondary (undereducation) and 
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tertiary education (overeducation). Moreover, the incidence of undereducation increases with 
workers' age, as opposed to the incidence of overeducation which falls as age increases. 
 
[Figure 1, around here] 
 
Figure 2 shows the relationship between educational mismatch and wages. To the extent that 
individuals in our sample have different levels of education, we do not plot wages directly, but 
rather show the residuals of a regression of log wages on years of schooling and other controls. 
The horizontal axis represents educational mismatch measured by calculating the difference 
between workers' educational attainment and the mean of schooling for the job. A positive 
(negative) number represents an excess (deficit) of schooling compared to the mean of the 
occupation. As shown by the linear and lowess fits, there is a negative relationship between 
schooling mismatch and wages. 
 
[Figure 2, around here] 
 
Finallly, Figure 3 show the kernel density estimates of log real wages by education and mismatch. 
It is noteworthy that the undereducated tend to earn more than the adequately educated, while 
the overeducated, tend to earn less, according to what most of the empirical literature 
concludes with respect to effects of educational mismatch on wages. 
 
 [Figure 3, around here] 
 
4.- Econometric models 
4.1. - The earnings functions 
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This paper starts out from the two classic specifications of wage equations used in the literature 
on educational mismatch: the models proposed by Duncan and Hoffman (1981) and Verdugo 
and Verdugo (1989). To do this, Duncan and Hoffman break down the years of schooling attained 
(Sa) into years of schooling required by the job (Sr), years of overeducation (So) and years of 
undereducation (Su), using the following expression: 
 
𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝑆𝑆𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 − 𝑆𝑆𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎     (1) 
where 
𝑆𝑆𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = �𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 − 𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎  𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 > 𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎0, 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒                     ,     and      𝑆𝑆𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = �𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 − 𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎  𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 < 𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎0, 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒                     ,       (2) 
 
Replacing this expression in the Mincer wage equation, we obtain Duncan and Hoffman's model 
(3): 
𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 𝜇𝜇 + 𝛽𝛽𝑟𝑟 𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝛽𝛽𝑜𝑜  𝑆𝑆𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝛽𝛽𝑢𝑢𝑆𝑆𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎  +  𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝛾𝛾 + 𝜀𝜀𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎            (3) 
 
where wit is the log real wage of individual i in year t, Xit is a vector containing other explanatory 
variables (sex, work experience, experience squared, marital status and disability) with the 
corresponding vector of coefficients γ, and, finally, vit is an error term. 
 
βr is the return on required schooling. The coefficient βo represents the rise (βo> 0) in a worker's 
wage for each additional year of overeducation compared to an individual performing the same 
occupation and whose years of schooling match the job requirements. In the same way, βu 
measures the fall in a worker’s wages (βu <0) for each year of education deficit compared with 
another worker in the same position and whose years of schooling match the job requirements. 
 
The Mincer equation is a restricted form of the Duncan and Hoffman's model which incorporates 
the constraint of equal coefficients (βr = βo = - βu), indicating that individuals’ wages depend on 
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their education and other personal attributes which determine their productivity, rather than 
on the job characteristics. The alternative view is set out in the model of job-competition 
developed by Thurow (1975), who proposes that wages do not depend on the individual but 
rather on the characteristics of the jobs they hold. In Thurow's model, overeducation and 
undereducation coefficients are equal to zero (βo = βu = 0) and wages depend only on the years 
of schooling required for the job (βr). 
 
Meanwhile Verdugo and Verdugo (1989) use a specification that incorporates the level of 
education attained by the individual (Sa) rather than the years of schooling required by the job 
(Sr). Although in Verdugo and Verdugo the variables related to the educational deficit and excess 
are coded as dummies, in our work they are measured in years, resulting in the following 
expression: 
 
𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 𝜇𝜇 + 𝛽𝛽𝑎𝑎 𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝛽𝛽𝑜𝑜 𝑆𝑆𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎  + 𝛽𝛽𝑢𝑢 𝑆𝑆𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎  +  𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝛾𝛾 + 𝜉𝜉𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎                 (4) 
 
In Verdugo and Verdugo's model, βo represents the wage penalty (βo <0) experienced by a 
worker for each year of overeducation compared to another worker with the same level of 
education who is employed in a position according to his/her education. Meanwhile, βu 
measures the increase in wages (βu> 0) of a worker for each year of education deficit compared 
to another worker with the same level of education in a job that matches his/her education. 
 
4.2.- The Fixed-effects Estimator 
 
Let us assume that wages are set according to Duncan and Hoffman's model and as expressed 
as follows: 
𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 𝜇𝜇 + 𝛽𝛽𝑟𝑟 𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝛽𝛽𝑜𝑜  𝑆𝑆𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎  + 𝛽𝛽𝑢𝑢 𝑆𝑆𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎  +  𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝛾𝛾 + (𝛼𝛼𝑎𝑎 + 𝜀𝜀𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎)   (5) 
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𝜀𝜀𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎~ 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (0,𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀2) 
 
in which the error has an idiosyncratic component ε it and an individual component α i, time 
invariant, which represents ability. In the event that there is correlation between the 
explanatory variables and ability, the estimation by OLS may be biased: 
 
?̂?𝛽𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 = 𝛽𝛽 + � �(𝑥𝑥𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 − ?̅?𝑥𝑇𝑇
𝑎𝑎=1
)(𝑥𝑥𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 − ?̅?𝑥)´𝑁𝑁
𝑎𝑎=1
�
−1
�𝑇𝑇�(𝑥𝑥𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 − ?̅?𝑥𝑁𝑁
𝑎𝑎=1
)(𝛼𝛼𝑎𝑎 − 𝛼𝛼�)�  (6) 
 
The ordinary least squares estimator of β is inconsistent if the second component of expression 
(7) does not tend to zero (Hsiao, 2003). The bias depends on the correlation between xit and α i. 
For example, to the extent that the ability correlates positively with years of undereducation 
and negatively with years of overeducation, the bias will reduce the absolute value of the 
coefficients βu and βo in Duncan and Hoffman's model. The use of panel data techniques allows 
us to control the influence of the omitted variables in the model, either by taking first differences 
or, as in this paper, by estimating the deviation from the mean of each individual. If you calculate 
the mean wage of each individual over time as 
 
𝑒𝑒�𝑎𝑎 = 𝜇𝜇 + 𝛽𝛽𝑟𝑟 𝑆𝑆?̅?𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝛽𝛽𝑜𝑜 𝑆𝑆?̅?𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎  + 𝛽𝛽𝑢𝑢 𝑆𝑆?̅?𝑢𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎  +  𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝛾𝛾 + (𝛼𝛼𝑎𝑎 + 𝜀𝜀?̅?𝑎𝑎𝑎) (7) 
 
the specification in differences from the mean of each individual can be obtained by subtracting 
(7) from (5). As can be seen, the constant μ and the individual component of the error 
representing ability α i, disappear: 
 
𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 − 𝑒𝑒�𝑎𝑎 = 𝛽𝛽𝑟𝑟 (𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 − 𝑆𝑆?̅?𝑟𝑎𝑎) + 𝛽𝛽𝑜𝑜 (𝑆𝑆𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 − 𝑆𝑆?̅?𝑜𝑎𝑎) + 𝛽𝛽𝑢𝑢 (𝑆𝑆𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 − 𝑆𝑆?̅?𝑢𝑎𝑎) +  (𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 − 𝑋𝑋�𝑎𝑎) 𝛾𝛾 + (𝜀𝜀𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 − 𝜀𝜀?̅?𝑎)   (8) 
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It is important to remember that the fixed-effects estimator uses the "within" information and 
it does not enable us to estimate the effect of the characteristics that do not vary within each 
individual, such as sex or country, which, moreover, disappear from the model in differences. 
 
4.3. - Measurement Error in Educational Mismatch 
One of the problems facing the literature on overeducation is the bias resulting from errors in 
measuring educational mismatch (Leuven and Oosterbeek, 2011). In this study we use two 
alternative indicators to measure educational mismatch, the mean and the mode, which are 
strongly correlated8. The correlation is high but not perfect, suggesting the existence of some 
degree of measurement error in the regressors.  
 
In this paper we will use instrumental variables estimation to correct the bias resulting from 
measurement error with respect to educational mismatch. Following a procedure similar to that 
used by Robst (1994), Dolton and Silles (2008) and Verhaest and Omey (2012), the Sr, So and Su 
variables calculated with the mean will be instrumented with the respective variables obtained 
with the mode. Estimation by instrumental variables is the method commonly used to correct 
the biases of unknown size and unknown direction resulting from the estimation of models in 
which one or more of the independent variables are measured with error (Green, 2003)9.  
 
5. - Results 
Table 3 shows the results of the estimation of the Mincer wage equation. The return on an 
additional year of attained schooling increases moderately during the period, so we can state 
that the demand for skilled labor must have grown in the Eurozone, in a context of the expansion 
                                                          
8 The correlation between the two measures of years of education required (Sr), years of overeducation 
(So) and years of undereducation (Su) are, respectively, 0.9048, 0.8512 and 0.8497.  
9 The results should be interpreted with caution, bearing in mind Leuven and Oosterbeek's (2011) criticism 
of the satisfaction of the assumptions of classical type measurement error in the ORU earning equations. 
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of tertiary education, a fact that is consistent with the hypothesis of skilled-biased technological 
change. The parameter estimates are stable over time and are consistent with the results found 
in the literature10.  
[Table 3, around here] 
The last columns of Table 3 compare the estimates of the pooled model by OLS with those 
obtained using panel data techniques, estimating by GLS (random effects) and by covariance 
(fixed effects). The results of estimating the pooled OLS model are very similar to those of the 
OLS estimates for each year discussed immediately above. However, the F-test indicates that 
there is heterogeneity in the individual constants. The hypothesis that the individual constants 
(α i) are homogeneous is rejected, so the estimation of the pooled OLS model, which considers 
that the constants do not vary across individuals, is inconsistent. The estimation of the Mincer 
equation by GLS shows similar results to those obtained in the pooled model. The return on each 
additional year of schooling falls slightly, while significant changes are not observed in the other 
parameters. However, the decrease in the size of the coefficients is very important in the 
estimation of fixed effects in this case, especially in the case of the return on attained education, 
which falls to less than one tenth of that obtained in the pooled model.  
 
The left panel of Table 4 shows the results of the estimations of Verdugo and Verdugo's (1989) 
model with the mean index measure of job educational requirements. The inclusion of the years 
of overeducation and undereducation, increases the return on schooling from 8.0% to 12.0% in 
the pooled model. Workers suffer a 7.7% penalty for each year of overeducation, and a return 
of 9.3% per year of undereducation. The generalized least squares estimates (random-effects) 
barely change compared to those obtained in the pooled model. In contrast, the fixed-effects 
estimation shows a considerable drop in the size of the coefficients to 1.7% of return for each 
                                                          
10 See Card (1999) and Murillo et al. (2011). 
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year of schooling, -1.5% for each year of overeducation and 1.0% for each year of 
undereducation.  
[Table 4, around here] 
A reduction in the absolute value of the coefficients in the fixed-effects estimation is also 
observed by Tsai (2009) and Korpi and Tahlin (2009), but not by Bauer (2002). As explained by 
Korpi and Tahlin (2009), the fall in the coefficients in the within-group estimation may be 
explained by: a) the failure to measure the influence of other regressors that do not vary over 
time and disappear from the fixed-effects estimation, b) the time period covered by the panel, 
that may not be long enough to collect the total effect of changes in the educational mismatch; 
and c) the attenuation bias that the measurement error can generate, which tends to be 
exacerbated when the variables are measured in differences. As noted in a previous section, this 
paper corrects the measurement error through estimation by instrumental variables. 
 
The fourth column of Table 4 shows the estimates of the fixed-effects instrumental variable 
model. Overeducated workers suffer a wage penalty of similar size to the return on attained 
education, while the return on underschooling is of similar magnitude to the return on attained 
schooling. Moreover, the estimation by instrumental variables increases the size of the 
coefficients, suggesting that the measurement error produces attenuation bias. The return on 
attained schooling rises from 1.7% to 3.0%; that of underschooling from 1.0% to 2.9%, and the 
penalty for overschooling increases from -1.5% to -2.5%.  
 
The human capital theory tests, in which the years of overeducation and undereducation do not 
have a significant effect on wages (βo = βu = 0), are rejected in all the specifications. In parallel, 
the test of the job-competition model (βa = -βo = βu) is rejected in the pooled model and in the 
random-effects model. However, it cannot be rejected at a level of significance of 1% in the 
fixed-effects model and at 10% in the fixed-effects instrumental variable model. As a result, we 
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can provisionally conclude that once the omitted variable bias is controlled, wages depend on 
the job educational requirements rather than exclusively on the level of attained schooling. 
 
The right panel of Table 4 shows the estimates of the ORU equation (Duncan and Hoffman, 
1981), using the mean index. The results of the pooled model and of the random-effects model 
are very similar. If we focus on the latter, wages rise 12.9% for each year of required education 
and 3.8% for each year of overeducation, and decrease by 2.7% for each year of undereducation. 
Moreover, the size of the effects falls in the fixed-effects estimation to a return of 2.7% on 
required education, and a penalty of 0.5% per year of undereducation, while the overeducation 
coefficient is not statistically different from zero. Finally, the last column shows the estimates of 
the fixed-effects instrumental variables model, where we instrument the mean indexes of Sr, So 
and Su with the mode counterparts. As in the previous case, the absolute size of the coefficients 
increases in the model estimated by IV, suggesting the existence of attenuation bias. The return 
on overschooling is significant at 10%, although its magnitude (0.6%) falls substantially to less 
than 20% of the coefficient estimated for required schooling (3.5%). In addition, undereducated 
workers experience a penalty in their remuneration of similar size (-0.8%). Therefore, wages 
depend basically on the educational requirements of jobs. As in Verdugo and Verdugo's model, 
the test of human capital theory (βr = -βo = βu) is rejected in all the specifications and the test 
of job-competition theory (βo = βu = 0) is rejected in all cases except in the fixed-effects model, 
that cannot be rejected at a 1% level of significance.  
 
One condition of the method of instrumental variables is that the instruments have to be 
partially correlated with the endogenous explanatory variables once the other exogenous 
variables have been netted out (Wooldridge, 2010). In order to assess the relevance of the 
instrumental variables, Table 5 shows the reduced form equations for the variables measured 
with error. The first three columns of the table exhibit the linear projections of Sr, So and Su 
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calculated using the mean on the counterpart variables calculated using the mode. The next 
three columns show the same linear projections including all the exogenous variables. The 
reduced form results indicate that there is a strong and positive relationship between the two 
alternative measures of educational mismatch. Moreover, the estimation of the reduced form 
for the logarithm of wages on the instruments and the other exogenous variables show the same 
pattern of results obtained in tables 4 and 5.  
[Table 5, around here] 
In Table 6 we estimate the instrumental variables fixed-effects model by sex and age groups. We 
show the results of Verdugo and Verdugo's wage equation in the left panel and those obtained 
from Duncan and Hoffman's model in the panel on the right. Looking at the first two columns of 
each panel we find that the main conclusions drawn so far are upheld for both men and women. 
However, the differences in the results by age groups are remarkable, pointing at a pattern 
whereby the wages of people aged under 35 are determined primarily by their level of attained 
schooling, while those of the over 35s are more subject to the educational requirements of the 
job.  
[Table 6, around here] 
These results can be interpreted as follows. In the first stage of working life wages depend on 
education and experience but as workers get older, their earnings come to depend on the 
educational requirements of jobs. It seems that when you are under 35 employers pay you based 
on who you are (human capital), while when you reach 35 and above, they pay you in accordance 
with what you do (job competition). In fact, this shift in the determinants of wages by age may 
reflect the fact that level of education is a valid indicator of worker productivity only in the early 
years of transition to the labor market. However, as age increases, the skills and productivity of 
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individuals with the same level of educational attainment become far more heterogeneous11. 
Most workers maintain or increase their human capital stock by learning in the workplace 
(learning-by-doing); others, however, may suffer a depreciation of their human capital if they 
have never used their skills (overeducation) or if they experienced career interruptions12.  
 
The differences in the skills and productivity of workers with the same schooling, which sharpen 
with age, explain the apparent shift from a world governed by the human capital theory to a 
world governed by the job-competition theory. However, if our interpretation is correct, as we 
move away from the moment of transition from school to labor market, wages are actually set 
by the workers' skills and productivity. Therefore overeducation does not lead to an 
underutilization of skills, but it does reflect a certain waste of resources in relation to some of 
the human capital investments made in the past. 
 
As mentioned above, career interruptions constitute one of the determinants of human capital 
depreciation. In order to shed some light on the effect of career interruptions on educational 
mismatch, we estimated a multinomial logit model with the sample of people aged 35 and over 
(see Table 7). Apart from the usual variables (sex, age or experience), we are interested in 
studying the influence on the likelihood of being overeducated and undereducated (the 
reference category is adequately educated) of: a) involuntary job changes from the previous 
year (“end of temporary contracts, business closures, firing, child or dependent person care, or 
move due to partner’s work”), and b) changes in employment status from the previous year, 
                                                          
11 The same idea is defended by Green and McIntosh (2007) who claim that "it is necessary to remove the 
assumption that all individuals with the same qualifications are homogeneous". Similarly, OECD (2011) 
states that "only a small fraction of educational mismatch actually reflects a mismatch in competencies 
and skills". 
12 As pointed out by De Grip and Van Loo (2002), human capital can depreciate as a result of technical 
obsolescence of skills, either through wear (aging) or atrophy, i.e. the absence or limited use of skills due 
to career interruptions (e.g., unemployment or inactivity) and to overeducation. In a later work, De Grip 
et al. (2008) stress that "workers who are employed in a job for which they are overeducated are more 
vulnerable to a decline in their productivity". 
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from "unemployment to employment" and from "inactivity to employment”. We assume that 
transitions from unemployment and inactivity to employment involve a loss of general and 
specific human capital, and involuntary job changes may imply a loss of specific human capital. 
 
Table 7 exhibits the marginal effects after the multinomial logit, evaluated at the mean of the 
two educational categories most affected by educational mismatch. In particular, we have 
chosen the category of tertiary education (16 years of attained schooling) to calculate the 
marginal effects of the independent variables on the probability of being overeducated, and 
primary education (10 years of attained schooling) to study the effects on the probability of 
being undereducated.  
 
As expected, overeducation increases with years of attained schooling and decreases with work 
experience (the opposite is true of undereducation). As for the effect of changes of employment 
and transitions in activity status on the probability of being overeducated or undereducated, 
results are in all cases significant and show the expected sign. An involuntary job change 
increases the probability of being overeducated by 6.6 percentage points, while the transition 
from unemployment or inactivity to employment raises it by 16.9 and 9.4 percentage points, 
respectively. At the same time, an involuntary job change decreases the probability of being 
undereducated by 3.3 percentage points, while the transition from unemployment or inactivity 
to employment reduces it by 5.2 and 4.9 percentage points, respectively. It should be noted that 
the probability of being overeducated, calculated at the mean of the individuals with 16 years 
of attained schooling, is 22.8%, while that of being undereducated evaluated at the mean of 
people with 10 years of attained schooling is 18.1%. 
[Table 7, around here] 
6.- Discussion and Conclusions 
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Over the last three decades, the EU has invested heavily in education. At present, one third of 
the EU population aged 30-34 holds a tertiary education degree, and in 2009 the student 
population in higher education reached almost 19.5 million individuals (Eurydice, 2012). At the 
same time, the demand for skilled labor has increased, yet in 2010 21.2% of graduates worked 
in low skilled jobs, for which it was not necessary to hold a higher education degree13.  
 
In this paper we have sought to analyze the effect of educational mismatch on wages. The basic 
question we pose is whether wages depend on the educational attainment of the individual, 
regardless of the job performed, or rather are determined by the educational requirements of 
jobs. We have a twofold objective. First, to contrast two alternative theoretical approaches to 
the functioning of the labor market, namely, the human capital and the job-competition 
theories, with the empirical evidence for the EU. Second, to determine whether educational 
mismatch implies a waste of resources, and is therefore a problem which the public authorities 
need to address. 
 
Most of the empirical studies that attempt to measure the impact of educational mismatch on 
wages have been criticized for not taking the omitted variable bias into account. If over- and 
under-education are correlated with ability or family background, the estimate of the effect of 
educational mismatch on wages will be biased. Moreover, error in the measurement of the 
variables may also generate a bias. This paper has employed a consistent estimator for the two 
econometric problems mentioned, using a rich database (EU-SILC, Eurostat) which gave us a 
sample of more than 66,000 full-time workers of 11 European countries. 
 
The main conclusions of our paper are: 
 
                                                          
13 Eurydice (2012), information obtained from the European Labour Force Survey (Eurostat). 
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1) During the period 2006-2009 the return on attained schooling did not fall, but remained 
stable or even showed a moderate rise. From a basic supply and demand perspective, this 
means that the demand for skilled labor has grown, in parallel with the remarkable expansion 
of education in Europe, a result consistent with the skill biased technological change 
hypothesis. 
 
2) The instrumental variable fixed-effects estimation indicates that overeducated workers 
suffer a wage penalty similar in magnitude to the return on attained schooling. This result 
holds in the two alternative specifications of the wage equation, in samples of men, women and 
both sexes. In other words, wages depend mainly on the educational requirements of jobs, and 
the return of an additional year of schooling over the level of education required for the job is 
very small. Moreover, the wages of undereducated people are slightly lower than those of 
workers in the same occupation but with the level of education required for the job, with the 
wage penalty relatively higher in the case of men than women . 
 
3) The wages of people under 35 largely depend on the level of schooling attained (human 
capital theory), regardless of the occupation held, while those of people over 35 depend mainly 
on job educational requirements (job-competition theory). 
 
4) The pattern obtained, which varies in accordance with workers' age, is interpreted in terms 
of the effect of skills depreciation (or appreciation) on human capital. As worker´s age 
increases, level of education attained becomes a less accurate measure of their human capital, 
to the extent that skills appreciate (underschooling) or depreciate (overschooling) in function of 
their use. If this interpretation is correct, the wages of people over 35 are determined in 
accordance with their current productivity and skills (human capital theory), and not by the level 
of education attained at the moment of transition from school to the labor market (job-
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competition theory). Thus we believe that the distinction between education and skills may 
reconcile both theories and is the key to understanding the problem of educational mismatch. 
 
5) Transitions from inactivity and unemployment to employment, and involuntary job changes 
increase the likelihood of being overeducated and reduce the probability of being 
undereducated. This result is consistent with the role that, in our opinion, the depreciation of 
skills plays in educational mismatch. Finally, the probability of being overeducated 
(undereducated) increases (decreases) with attained schooling, and decreases (increases) with 
experience. 
 
In terms of policy recommendations, we consider that: 
- We should start out from the premise that overeducated people aged over 35 suffer a wage 
penalty, and for this reason we conclude that overeducation implies a waste of resources, both 
public and private. As noted in the introduction, public spending in tertiary education represents 
1.1% of the EU GDP. According to the empirical results obtained in this paper, and correcting for 
the duration and the higher incidence of educational mismatch in the ISCED 5B  programs, the 
waste of resources is estimated at between 0.12 and 0.15 percentage points of EU GDP, ie 
between 10.8% and 14.0% of public spending on tertiary education. It is this which makes the 
analysis of determinants of educational mismatch of particular interest. Hence, we must focus 
on the education system itself, and on the factors that cause the depreciation of skills. 
 
- With respect to education, many authors point to the need to reform an education system that 
results in some graduates never obtaining a job matching their qualifications. As noted by 
Chevalier (2003), "overeducation originates not from disequilibria in the market for graduates, 
but from the lack of skills acquired by graduates at university." In a similar vein, Green and 
McIntosh (2007) suggest that some workers "have acquired a ‘wrong’ type of human capital, in 
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the sense that these qualifications are less demanded on the labor market." Therefore, public 
authorities should reform the education system to provide graduates with the skills the market 
demands. Better career guidance may also play an important role in reducing educational 
mismatch, which varies considerably by field of study (Quintini, 2011). 
 
- As for the depreciation of skills, the empirical evidence obtained in this study confirms that 
people who experience an involuntary job change and those who have had periods of 
unemployment or inactivity are more likely to be overeducated. In a context of massive 
unemployment in some EU countries, the public authorities should intensify their efforts to 
minimize the loss of human capital that unemployment and inactivity signify in the European 
labor force. The basic instrument available to improve the unemployed's chances of finding 
work are demand-side stimulus policies. On the supply side, an attempt should be made to 
improve the information available on job vacancies in a bid to encourage national and 
international mobility and to promote lifelong learning.  
 
Finally, one question that requires a further analysis is the treatment of the measurement error 
of educational mismatch14. Further research would also serve to cast greater light on the study 
of the determinants of educational mismatch, focusing on the education system itself and the 
analysis of the factors causing the depreciation of skills. Moreover, it would be interesting to 
investigate the effectiveness of lifelong learning in correcting the depreciation of human capital 
and, ultimately, in reducing the incidence of overeducation. 
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Table 1.- Summary statistics 
 
 Mean SD (overall) SD (between) SD (within) Min Max Observ. Indiv. 
Log wage 10.01 0.72 0.75 0.23 2.27 12.41 143,652 66,538 
Edu attained (years) 12.25 3.28 3.27 0.55 0.00 16.00 143,652 66,538 
Mean Index 
Required education (years) 12.22   2.18   2.14   0.37   3.67          16.00 143,652 66,538 
Years of  overeducation 
 (for those overeducated) 3.84      1.12        1.11 0.26 0.83       10.20 15,019 8,348 
Years of  undereducation 
 (for those undereducated) 4.39         2.31        2.35 0.48 1.33       15.74 18,267 10,353 
Mode index 
Required education (years) 12.66    2.78 2.71 0.62 0.00 16.00 143,652 66,538 
Years of  overeducation 
 (for those overeducated)  3.41         1.64          1.60 0.39 1.00       13.00 24,153 13,343 
Years of  undereducation 
 (for those undereducated)  4.07         2.30        2.28 0.63  1.00       16.00 34,728 18,250 
         
Female  0.38   0.49 0.49  0.00 0.00  1.00 143,652 66,538 
Experience 18.70  11.37 11.62 1.47 0.00 65.00 130,283 60,229 
Exper. Squared 479.08 485.15 491.88 69.73 0.00 4225.00 130,283 60,229 
Disabled 0.02   0.14 0.11 0.09 0.00  1.00 143,652 66,538 
Married 0.58   0.49 0.49 0.09 0.00  1.00 143,652 66,538 
 
Note: For a more precise definition of the variables, note that wages are defined as the "natural logarithm of annual 
gross wages in real terms (base 2005)", years of education are derived from the variable "highest ISCED level 
attained", experience measures the "number of years spent in paid work" and disabled is defined as "strongly limited 
in activities because of health problems". 
 
Source: EUSILC LONGITUDINAL UDB 2009 – version 2 of March 2012 (Eurostat). Own calculations. 
 
 
Table 2.- Educational mismatch according to the mean and the mode measures (cells in %) 
 
  Mode index 
[all observations 
pooled] Overeducated 
Adequately 
educated Undereducated 
Row 
total 
Mean index  
Overeducated 9.63  0.82  0.00 10.46 
Adequately educated 7.18 57.82 11.83 76.83 
Undereducated 0.00  0.37 12.34 12.72 
Column total 16.81       59.01       24.18 100.00 
 
Note: Table 2 shows the relative frequency of each cell in the two-way table. “Row total” displays the educational 
mismatch according to the mean index, while “Column total” exhibits the educational mismatch according to the 
mode index. The diagonal shows the proportion of observations that fall into the same categories according to the 
two measures (79.79% of total). 
 
Source: EUSILC LONGITUDINAL UDB 2009 – version 2 of March 2012 (Eurostat). Own calculations. 
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Table 3.- Mincer wage equation 
OLS 2006 (Cross section) 2007 (Cross section) 2008 (Cross section) 2009 (Cross section) POOLED OLS RANDOM EFFECTS FIXED EFFECTS 
Ln real wage 𝜷𝜷�  (S.E.) 𝜷𝜷�  (S.E.) 𝜷𝜷�  (S.E.) 𝜷𝜷�   (S.E.) 𝜷𝜷�   (Rob. S. E.) 𝜷𝜷�   (Rob. S. E.) 𝜷𝜷�   (Rob. S. E.) 
Sa 
 
Female 
 
Exp 
 
Exp2 
 
Constant 
        0.078*** 
 (0.001) 
       -0.200*** 
  (0.009) 
        0.046*** 
 (0.001) 
       -0.001*** 
 (0.000) 
       8.641*** 
(0.032) 
      0.078*** 
(0.001) 
     -0.207*** 
(0.006) 
      0.050*** 
(0.001) 
     -0.001*** 
(0.000) 
       8.519*** 
 (0.016) 
       0.079*** 
(0.001) 
     -0.219*** 
(0.005) 
      0.049*** 
(0.001) 
     -0.001*** 
(0.000) 
      8.485*** 
(0.013) 
       0.085*** 
 (0.001) 
      -0.211*** 
 (0.006) 
       0.050*** 
 (0.001) 
      -0.001*** 
 (0.000) 
        8.389*** 
 (0.015) 
      0.080*** 
(0.001) 
     -0.211*** 
(0.004) 
      0.049*** 
(0.001) 
     -0.001*** 
 (0.000) 
      8.468*** 
 (0.012) 
      0.069*** (0.001) 
    -0.217*** 
(0.005) 
      0.053*** 
 (0.001) 
     -0.001*** 
(0.000) 
      8.542*** 
(0.013) 
      0.007*** 
(0.002) 
--- 
--- 
       0.051*** 
(0.002) 
     -0.001*** 
 (0.000) 
        9.298*** 
  (0.034) 
 R2     =  0.3997 R2    =  0.4163 R2    =  0.4401 R2     =  0.4434 R2   =  0.4308 R2  = 0.4276 R2    =  0.1196 
Notes: In parenthesis, cluster-robust standard errors to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation, calculated with Stata. All regressions include country dummies. Hausman specification test:  chi2(5)= 1,979. Prob>chi2 = 0.0000. R2 refers to 
overall R2 for the RE and FE models. Pooled sample size: 130,283 observations of 60,229 individuals. Annual sample size: 14,939 observations in 2006; 33,311 observations in 2007; 45,030 observations in 2008, and 37,003 observations in 
2009. * Significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.  
Source: EUSILC LONGITUDINAL UDB 2009 – version 2 of March 2012 (Eurostat). Own calculations. 
 
Table 4.- “Verdugo and Verdugo“ and “Duncan and Hoffman” models 
Verdugo and Verdugo model Duncan and Hoffman model 
MEAN INDEX POOLED OLS RANDOM-EFFECTS FIXED-EFFECTS IV FIXED-EFFECTS MEAN INDEX POOLED OLS RANDOM EFFECTS FIXED EFFECTS IV FIXED EFFECTS 
Ln real wage 𝜷𝜷�  (Rob. S.E.) 𝜷𝜷�   (Rob. S.E.) 𝜷𝜷�   (Rob. S.E.) 𝜷𝜷�   (S.E.) Ln real wage 𝜷𝜷�   (Rob. S.E.) 𝜷𝜷�   (Rob. S.E.) 𝜷𝜷�   (Rob. S.E.) 𝜷𝜷�   (S.E.) 
    Sa 
 
    So 
 
    Su 
 
Constant 
      0.120*** 
(0.001) 
    -0.077*** 
(0.002) 
     0.093*** 
(0.002) 
        8.002*** 
 (0.013) 
       0.106*** 
 (0.001) 
     -0.059*** 
(0.002) 
      0.075*** 
(0.002) 
      8.103*** 
(0.014) 
      0.017*** 
(0.003) 
     -0.015*** 
(0.003) 
      0.010*** 
(0.002) 
      9.187*** 
(0.039) 
      0.030*** 
(0.004) 
     -0.025*** 
(0.004) 
      0.029*** 
(0.005) 
       9.023*** 
 (0.049) 
    Sr 
 
    So 
 
    Su 
 
Constant 
       0.143*** 
 (0.001) 
       0.042*** 
 (0.002) 
      -0.030*** 
 (0.001) 
      7.790*** 
(0.013) 
        0.129*** 
  (0.001) 
        0.038*** 
  (0.002) 
       -0.027*** 
  (0.001) 
       7.881*** 
 (0.015) 
        0.027*** 
  (0.003) 
  0.001 
  (0.003) 
       -0.005*** 
  (0.002) 
       9.078*** 
 (0.044) 
         0.035*** 
   (0.004) 
     0.006* 
   (0.003) 
        -0.008*** 
    (0.002) 
        8.983*** 
  (0.054) 
Test H.C. model 
(βo  = βu  = 0) 
F(2, 60228) =    2551 
Prob> F      = 0.0000 
chi2(2)   =    3207 
Prob> chi2 = 0.0000 
F(2, 60228)   =     20.56 
Prob> F      = 0.0000 
chi2(2)    =           56.43 
Prob> chi2  =   0.0000 
Test H.C. model 
(β r  = βo  = -βu) 
F(2, 60228)  =     3534 
Prob> F      = 0.0000 
chi2(2) =    4995 
Prob> chi2 = 0.0000 
F(2, 60228) =    31.81 
Prob> F      = 0.0000 
chi2(2)    =     59.86 
Prob> chi2  =  0.0000 
Test job Comp. Model 
(βa  = -βo  = βu) 
F(2, 60228) =       673 
Prob> F      = 0.0000 
chi2(2)   =   1533 
Prob> chi2 = 0.0000 
F(2, 60228)    =     4.39 
Prob> F      = 0.0124 
chi2(2)    =     4.35 
Prob> chi2  =   0.1136 
Test Job Comp. model 
(βo  = βu  = 0) 
F(2, 60228) =       692 
Prob> F      = 0.0000 
chi2(2)   =        1160 
Prob> chi2 =  0.0000 
F(2, 60228) =      3.41 
Prob> F      = 0.0330 
chi2(2)    =     17.85 
Prob> chi2  =  0.0001 
 R2  =  0.4678 R2  =  0.4649 R2  = 0.1478 R2  =     0.1846  R2  = 0.4766 R2  =   0.4745 R2  = 0.1698 R2  =     0.1933 
Notes: In parenthesis, cluster-robust standard errors to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation, calculated with Stata. All regressions include country dummies. Hausman specification test in the Verdugo and Verdugo model:  chi2(7)= 
2364. Prob>chi2 = 0.0000. Hausman specification test in the Duncan and Hoffman model:  chi2(7)= 1924. Prob>chi2 = 0.0000. R2 refers to overall R2 for the random effects and fixed effects models. Sample size: 130,283 observations of 
60,229 individuals. * Significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.  
Source: EUSILC LONGITUDINAL UDB 2009 – version 2 of March 2012 (Eurostat). Own calculations. 
 
 
29 
 
Table 5.- Reduced form equations 
 FIXED EFFECTS FIXED EFFECTS IV FIXED-EFFECTS 
Variables Sr (mean) So (mean) Su (mean) Sr (mean) So (mean) Su (mean) Ln real wage Ln real wage 
Panel A.- Verdugo and Verdugo model 
Sa 
 
So (mode) 
 
Su (mode) 
 
Constant 
     
 
      0.618*** 
(0.002) 
 
 
     0.046*** 
(0.002) 
        
   
 
  
      0.592*** 
(0.002) 
     -0.025*** 
(0.002) 
       0.113*** 
(0.003) 
     0.592*** 
(0.002) 
     0.074*** 
(0.002) 
      -1.298*** 
(0.037) 
     -0.358*** 
(0.003) 
     0.118*** 
(0.003) 
      0.398*** 
(0.003) 
       4.461*** 
(0.044) 
      0.017*** 
(0.002) 
     -0.011*** 
(0.002) 
      0.010*** 
(0.002) 
       9.182*** 
 (0.030) 
      0.030*** 
(0.004) 
     -0.025*** 
(0.004) 
      0.029*** 
(0.005) 
       9.023*** 
 (0.049) 
Individual dummies  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Other controls  No No  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  R2  =  0.7245 R2  =  0.7219  R2  = 0.7152 R2  =     0.6156 R2  =  0.1507 R2  =     0.1846 
Panel B.- Duncan and Hoffman model 
Sr (mode) 
 
So (mode) 
 
Su (mode) 
 
Constant 
      0.365*** 
(0.002) 
 
 
 
 
     7.594*** 
(0.021) 
    
 
      0.618*** 
(0.002) 
 
 
     0.046*** 
(0.002) 
        
   
 
  
      0.592*** 
(0.002) 
     -0.025*** 
(0.002) 
      0.388*** 
(0.003) 
0.005 
(0.003) 
     -0.033*** 
(0.002)   
      6.958*** 
(0.038) 
      0.113*** 
(0.003) 
     0.705*** 
(0.003) 
     -0.039*** 
(0.002) 
      -1.298*** 
(0.037) 
      -0.358*** 
(0.003) 
     -0.240*** 
(0.003) 
      0.755*** 
(0.002) 
       4.461*** 
 (0.044) 
      0.017*** 
(0.002) 
      0.006*** 
(0.002) 
     -0.008*** 
(0.002) 
       9.182*** 
 (0.030) 
         0.035*** 
   (0.004) 
     0.006* 
   (0.003) 
        -0.008*** 
    (0.002) 
        8.983*** 
  (0.054) 
Individual dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Other controls No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 R2  =  0.8187 R2  =  0.7245 R2  =  0.7219 R2  =  0.8113 R2  = 0.7152 R2  =     0.6156 R2  =  0.1507 R2  =     0.1933 
 
Notes: In parenthesis, standard errors. Other controls: experience, experience squared, disabled, and married. R2 refers to overall R2 for the random effects and fixed effects 
models. Sample size: 130,283 observations of 60,229 individuals. 
* Significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.  
 
Source: EUSILC LONGITUDINAL UDB 2009 – version 2 of March 2012 (Eurostat). Own calculations. 
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Table 6.- IV Fixed-Effects by sex and age groups 
 
Ln real wage 
Verdugo and Verdugo model (mean index) 
Ln real wage 
Duncan and Hoffman model (mean index) 
MEN WOMEN AGE < 35 AGE >= 35 MEN WOMEN AGE < 35 AGE >= 35 
𝜷𝜷�  (S.E.) 𝜷𝜷�  (S.E.) 𝜷𝜷�  (S.E.) 𝜷𝜷�  (S.E.) 𝜷𝜷�  (S.E.) 𝜷𝜷�  (S.E.) 𝜷𝜷�  (S.E.) 𝜷𝜷�  (S.E.) 
Sa 
 
So 
 
Su 
 
Constant 
         0.025*** 
   (0.004) 
       -0.020*** 
   (0.005) 
         0.022*** 
   (0.005) 
        9.142*** 
 (0.058) 
          0.039*** 
    (0.007)  
         -0.030*** 
    (0.006) 
          0.042*** 
    (0.010) 
          8.798*** 
(0.095) 
       0.030*** 
 (0.009) 
-0.008 
 (0.007) 
   0.021* 
 (0.012) 
       8.551*** 
(0.108) 
         0.024*** 
   (0.004) 
        -0.031*** 
   (0.004) 
         0.025*** 
   (0.005) 
       9.543*** 
(0.054) 
Sr 
 
So 
 
Su 
 
Constant 
           0.029*** 
     (0.005) 
    0.006  
    (0.004) 
         -0.008*** 
    (0.003) 
          9.121*** 
    (0.061) 
        0.047*** 
 (0.009) 
 0.006 
 (0.006) 
    -0.009** 
 (0.004) 
        8.724*** 
  (0.108) 
        0.032*** 
 (0.009) 
        0.020*** 
  (0.007) 
       -0.018*** 
 (0.005) 
        8.541*** 
 (0.111) 
        0.029*** 
  (0.005)  
-0.005 
 (0.004) 
  -0.004* 
 (0.002) 
      9.498*** 
(0.061) 
Test H.C. model 
(βo = βu = 0) 
chi2( 2)    =    23.46 
Prob> chi2 =  0.0000 
chi2( 2)    =     33.84 
Prob> chi2 =  0.0000 
chi2( 2)    =     3.05 
Prob> chi2 =  0.2174 
chi2( 2)    =     59.69 
Prob> chi2 =  0.0000 
Test H.C. model 
(β r  = βo = -βu) 
chi2( 2)      =      24.10      
Prob> chi2   =   0.0000 
chi2( 2)   =     37.23 
Prob> chi2   = 0.0000 
chi2( 2)  =        2.77 
Prob> chi2   =  0.2498 
chi2( 2)   =      61.04 
Prob> chi2   =   0.0000 
Test J.C. Model 
(βa = -βo = βu) 
chi2(  2)   =       4.06 
Prob> chi2 =  0.1311 
chi2(  2)   =       1.91 
Prob> chi2 =  0.3849 
chi2(  2)   =       16.70 
Prob> chi2 =  0.0002 
chi2(  2)   =       3.10 
Prob> chi2 =  0.2118 
Test J.C. model 
(βo = βu = 0) 
chi2(  2)   =       12.32 
Prob> chi2    =  0.0021 
chi2(2)    =        5.61 
Prob> chi2    =   0.0605 
chi2(  2)   =       20.65 
Prob> chi2 =  0.0000 
chi2(  2)   =         5.51 
Prob> chi2 =  0.0636 
 R2  = 0.1744 R2  = 0.1946 R2  = 0.1526 R2  = 0.1492  R2  =  0.1806 R2  = 0.2108 R2  = 0.1551 R2  = 0.1710 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. All regressions include country dummies. R2 refers to overall R2. Male sample: 79,772 observations of 35,940 individuals. Female sample: 50,511 observations of 24,289 individuals. 
Age<35 sample: 40,504 observations of 21,648 individuals. Age>=35 sample: 89,779 observations of 40,611 individuals. * Significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.Source: EUSILC 
LONGITUDINAL UDB 2009 – version 2 of March 2012 (Eurostat). Own calculations. 
 
Table 7.- Determinants of educational mismatch. Marginal effects after multinomial logit  (age >= 35). Mean index 
Marginal effects at Sa=16 (dy/dx) Marginal effects at Sa=10 (dy/dx) 
Pr(OVER)=0.2276 dy/dx S.E. Pr(UNDER)=0.1815 dy/dx S.E. 
  female† 
exp 
      Sa  
 married† 
invjobcha† 
unem_emp† 
inac_emp† 
 disabled† 
-0.052*** 
-0.003*** 
 0.115*** 
-0.038*** 
0.066*** 
0.169*** 
0.094*** 
       0.061*** 
0.007 
 0.000 
0.003 
0.008 
0.019 
  0.024 
0.030 
            0.023  
  female† 
exp 
      Sa  
 married† 
invjobcha† 
unem_emp† 
inac_emp† 
 disabled† 
       0.030*** 
0.004*** 
-0.114*** 
-0.006 
-0.033*** 
-0.052*** 
      -0.049*** 
-0.004 
0.006  
  0.000  
  0.002  
        0.006 
   0.011 
   0.009 
 0.015 
        0.012  
Pseudo R2         =     0.3613 ADEQ = base outcome 
 
Notes: In parenthesis, cluster-robust standard errors to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation, calculated with Stata. Regression includes country dummies. Sample size: 89,779 observations of 40,611 individuals. 
(†) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.  * Significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level. 
Source: EUSILC LONGITUDINAL UDB 2009 – version 2 of March 2012 (Eurostat). Own calculations. 
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Figure 1 
 
Figure 2 
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Figure 3.- Kernel density estimates of Ln real wage by educational level 
 
Source: EUSILC LONGITUDINAL UDB 2009 – version 2 of March 2012 (Eurostat). Own calculations 
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